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ABSTRACT
Resilience to electromagnetic jamming and its avoidance are
diﬃcult problems. It is often both hard to distinguish mali-
cious jamming from congestion in the broadcast regime and
a challenge to conceal the activity patterns of the legitimate
communication protocol from the jammer. In the context of
energy-constrained wireless sensor networks, nodes are sched-
uled to maximize the common sleep duration and coordi-
nate communication to extend their battery life. This re-
sults in well-deﬁned communication patterns with possibly
predictable intervals of activity that are easily detected and
jammed by a statistical jammer. We present an anti-jamming
protocol for sensor networks which eliminates spatio-temporal
patterns of communication while maintaining coordinated and
contention-free communication across the network. Our pro-
tocol, WisperNet, is time-synchronized and uses coordinated
temporal randomization for slot schedules and slot durations
at the link layer and adapts routes to avoid jammers in the
network layer. Through analysis, simulation and experimen-
tation we demonstrate that WisperNet reduces the eﬃciency
of any statistical jammer to that of a random jammer, which
has the lowest censorship-to-link utilization ratio. WisperNet
is more energy eﬃcient than low-power listen CSMA proto-
cols such as B-mac and is simple to analyze in terms of eﬀec-
tive network throughput, reliability and delay. WisperNet has
been implemented on the FireFly sensor network platform.
1. INTRODUCTION
Jamming is the radiation of electromagnetic energy in a
communication channel which reduces the eﬀective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate communication. Jam-
ming results in a loss of link reliability, increased energy con-
sumption, extended packet delays and disruption of end-to-
end routes. Jamming may be both malicious with the inten-
tion to block communication of an adversary or non-malicious
in the form of unintended channel interference. In the con-
text of embedded wireless networks for time-critical and safety
critical operation such as in medical devices and industrial
control networks, it is essential that mechanisms for resilience
to jamming are native to the communication protocol. Re-
silience to jamming and its avoidance, collectively termed as
anti-jamming, is a hard practical problem as the jammer has
an unfair advantage in detecting legitimate communication
activity due to the broadcast nature of the channel. The jam-
mer can then emit a sequence of electromagnetic pulses to
raise the noise ﬂoor and disrupt communication. Communi-
cation nodes are unable to diﬀerentiate jamming signals from
legitimate transmissions or changes in communication activ-
ity due to node movement or nodes powering oﬀ without some
minimum processing at the expense of local and network re-
sources.
In the case of energy-constrained wireless sensor networks,
nodes are scheduled to maximize the common sleep duration
and coordinate communication to extend their battery life.
With greater network synchronization, the communication is
more energy-eﬃcient as nodes wake up from low-power oper-
ation just before the common communication interval. Such
coordination introduces temporal patterns in communication
with predictable intervals of transmission activity. Channel
access patterns make it eﬃcient for a jammer to scan and
jam the channel only during activity intervals. The jammer
can time its pulse transmission to coincide with the preambles
of packets from legitimate nodes and thus have a high cen-
sorship to channel utilization ratio while remaining diﬃcult
to detect. The jammer is thus able to exploit the temporal
patterns in communication to disrupt a transmission of longer
length of legitimate transmissions with a small set of jamming
pulses.
For nodes in ﬁxed locations, a jammer can select regions
with heavier communication activity or denser connectivity
to increase the probability that a random jamming pulse re-
sults in corrupting an on-going transmission. Nodes in the
proximity of the jammer will endure a high cost of operation
in terms of energy consumption and channel utilization with
a low message delivery rate. They must either physically re-
locate or increase the cost of their links so the network may
adapt its routes.
Methods for anti-jamming must therefore address threats
due to both temporal patterns at the link layer and spa-
tial distribution of routes in the network layer. Our goal is
to reduce or eliminate spatio-temporal patterns in commu-
nication while maintaining energy-eﬃcient, coordinated and
collision-free operation in multi-hop wireless sensor networks.
We achieve this by incorporating coordinated temporal ran-
domization for slot schedules and slot durations between each
node and its k-hop neighbors. This prevents the jammer from
predicting the epoch and length of the next activity on the
channel. Such mechanisms reduce the eﬀectiveness of any sta-
tistical jammer to that of a random pulse jammer. While tem-
poral randomization prevents statistical jammers from deter-
mining any useful packet inter-arrival distribution for preemp-
tive attacks, it still has an eﬃciency of a random jammer and
can achieve censorship which increases linearly with channel
utilization and jamming activity. To avoid such random jam-
mers which are co-located near nodes with active routes, we
employ adaptive routing to select paths such that the highest
possible end-to-end packet delivery ratios are achieved. We
combine the above temporal and spatial schemes in a tightly
synchronized protocol where legitimate nodes are implicitly
coordinated network-wide while ensuring no spatio-temporal
patterns in communication are exposed to external observers.
In the context of multi-hop embedded wireless networks,
which are battery-operated and require low-energy consump-
tion, we require the following properties from the anti-jamming
protocol:
1. Non-predictable schedules: Transmission instances
(e.g. slot assignments) are randomized and non-repeating to
prevent the jammer from predicting the timing of the next slot
based on observations of channel activity. In this way, even if
the jammer successfully estimates slot sizes, it has to trans-
mit pulse attacks at an interval of the average slot duration
to corrupt communication between nodes. This is especially
ineﬃcient for networks with low channel utilization, which is
the common case in sensor networks, when the jammer must
expend several times more energy in jamming pulses to cor-
rupt a single legitimate transmission.
2. Non-predictable slot sizes: Slots are randomly sized on
a packet-by-packet basis in order to prevent the jammer from
estimating the duration of channel activity for energy eﬃcient
reactive jamming. This requirement further reduces the jam-
mer’s lifetime as it will need to employ the smallest observed
slot duration as its jamming interval. In addition, a reactive
jammer which observes the channel for activity before emit-
ting a jamming pulse, will only be eﬀective in jamming the
fraction of packets that are greater than a certain threshold
length.
3. Coordinated and scheduled transmission: The com-
munication schedule according to which a node transmits is
known to all of its legitimate neighbors so they can wake up
to receive the message during its transmission slot. This also
prevents nodes from turning on their receiver when no legiti-
mate activity is scheduled and hence reduces the likelihood of
a jammer draining the energy of a node. The schedule must
be determined implicitly without the need for frequent and
explicit node-to-node control message exchange. This allows
energy-eﬃcient operation and increases lifetime of every node
in the network.
4. Coordinated changes of slot sizes: All nodes must
be aware of the current and next slot sizes. This is very im-
portant because any incompatibility or synchronization error
would disable communication between legitimate nodes.
5. Collision-free transmission: Communication must sat-
isfy the hidden terminal problem so that a transmit slot of
a given node does not conﬂict with transmit slots of nodes
within its k-hop interference range. With scheduled commu-
nication with randomized slot assignment, it is essential that
scheduling conﬂicts are eliminated implicitly and incur no ad-
ditional overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2,
we provide a background and related work for energy eﬃcient
protocols and energy eﬃcient jamming schemes. In Section 3,
we provide an overview of the WisperNet anti-jamming pro-
tocol and describe the coordinated temporal randomization
scheme. In Section 4, we describe the WisperNet coordinated
spatial adaptation scheme. Section 5 describes our imple-
mentation experiences and experimental results followed by
the conclusion.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
To understand the inherent tradeoﬀ between energy eﬃ-
cient link protocols with well-deﬁned schedules and their sus-
ceptibility to jamming attacks, we ﬁrst describe the diﬀerent
types of jammers and their impact on various types of link
layer protocols. We then highlight a particular class of sta-
tistical jammers and their impact on energy-eﬃcient sensor
network link protocols.
2.1 Jammers and Trade-offs with Jamming
2.1.1 Comparison of Jamming Models
In [1] and [2], Xu et al. introduce four common types of
jammers: constant, random, reactive and deceptive. Con-
stant jammers continually emit a jamming signal and achieve
the highest censorship of packets corrupted to total packets
transmitted. The constant jammer, however, is not energy-
eﬃcient and can be easily detected and localized. The ran-
dom jammer is similar to the constant jammer but operates
at a lower duty cycle with intervals of sleep. A random jam-
mer transmits a jamming signal at instances derived from a
uniform distribution with a known minimum and maximum
interval. The censorship ratio of the random jammer is con-
stant and invariant to channel utilization. At low duty cycles,
the random jammer is diﬃcult to detect and avoid. A reactive
jammer keeps its receiver always on and listens for channel ac-
tivity. If a known preamble pattern is detected, the reactive
jammer quickly emits a jamming signal to corrupt the current
transmission. Reactive jammers, while eﬀective in corrupting
a large proportion of legitimate packets, are not energy eﬃ-
cient as the receiver is always on. A deceptive or protocol-
aware jammer is one that has knowledge of the link protocol
being used and the dependencies between packet types. Such
a jammer exploits temporal and sequential patterns of the
protocol and is very eﬀective.
In [3], a statistical jamming model is described where the
jammer ﬁrst observes temporal patterns in channel activity,
extracts a histogram of inter-arrival times between transmis-
sions and schedules jamming pulses based on the observed
distribution. This results in a very eﬀective jammer that is
not protocol-aware and is also diﬃcult to detect. A statisti-
cal jammer chooses its transmission interval to coincide with
the peak inter-arrival times and is thus able to maximize its
censorship ratio with relatively little eﬀort. Figure 1(a) illus-
trates the relative censorship ratio and the energy-eﬃciency
of the diﬀerent jammers. Figure 1(b) illustrates the relative
stealth or diﬃculty in detection. We observe that the sta-
tistical jammer has a high censorship ratio with both energy-
eﬃcient and stealthy operation and hence focus on combating
such jamming in the remainder of this paper.
2.1.2 Techniques for Robust Transmission
The traditional defenses against jamming include spread
spectrum techniques[4] where the energy of the signal is spread
across a very wide bandwidth. [paja rev3-1] Another im-
portant class of anti-jamming techniques is the chan-
nel hopping [5, 6] where signal transmission channel is
changing over time. While spread spectrum [paja rev3-1]
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Jammer’s Energy eﬃciency vs. Censor-
ship ratio and (b) Energy eﬃciency vs. Stealth
and frequency hopping techniques are important physical
layer mechanisms for combating jamming, additional protec-
tion is required at the packet-level. As in the case of standard
wireless protocols such as IEEE 802.11 and Bluetooth, the
jammer may know the pseudo-random noise code or frequency
hopping sequence. Furthermore, even if no information about
the spread spectrum protocol is available to the jammer, it can
still destroy a small number of bits in each transmitted packet
by sending a strong jamming signal of short duration.
There have been several eﬀorts to make communication in
sensor networks more robust in the presence of a jammer. In
[6], Wood et al. described DEEJAM, a link layer protocol that
includes several schemes for robust IEEE 802.15.4 based com-
munication for reactive and random jammers. While mech-
anisms such as coding and fragmentation are proposed, the
jammer still has a competitive advantage in that it may in-
crease the power of its jamming signal and a single jam-
ming signal is capable of jamming multiple links in the vicin-
ity. The authors assume that reactive jammers can be con-
sidered energy-eﬃcient. Current radio transceivers with the
IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer of communication, use almost
the same, if not greater, energy for receiving as they do for
transmission [7].
In cases where resilience to jamming is not possible, it is
useful to detect and estimate the extent to which the jam-
mer has inﬂuence over the network. A jammed-area mapping
protocol is described in [8] which can be used to delineate re-
gions aﬀected by a jammer. Such information can ultimately
be used for network routing. One of the requirements of the
protocol is that every node knows its own position along with
positions of all its neighbors. Our proposed solution, Wis-
perNet, does not require such position and direction informa-
tion and directly computes routes with the highest end-to-end
packet delivery rate.
2.2 Impact of Jamming on MAC Protocols
We now investigate the characteristics of diﬀerent classes of
sensor network link protocols and the impact of a jammer on
each class.
2.2.1 Energy-Efficient MAC Protocols
Several MAC protocols have been proposed for low-power
operation for multi-hop wireless mesh networks. Such proto-
cols may be categorized by their use of time synchronization
as asynchronous [9], loosely synchronous [10, 11] and fully
synchronized protocols [12, 13]. In general, with a greater
degree of synchronization between nodes, packet delivery is
more energy-eﬃcient due to the minimization of idle listening
when there is no communication, better collision avoidance
and elimination of overhearing of neighbor conversations.
Asynchronous protocols such as Carrier Sense Multiple
Access (CSMA) are susceptible to jamming both at the trans-
mitter (busy channel indication) and at the receiver (energy
Figure 2: Comparison of robustness to jamming and
energy eﬃcient operation of sensor MAC protocols
Figure 3: RT-Link time slot allocation with out-of-
band synchronization pulses
drain). The Berkeley MAC (B-MAC) [9] protocol performs
the best in terms of energy conservation and simplicity in de-
sign. B-MAC supports CSMA with low power listening (LPL)
where each node periodically wakes up after a sample inter-
val and checks the channel for activity for a short duration of
0.25ms. If the channel is found to be active, the node stays
awake to receive the payload following an extended preamble.
Using this scheme, nodes may eﬃciently check for neighbor
activity while maintaining no explicit schedule which a statis-
tical jammer may exploit.
Loosely-synchronous protocols such as S-MAC [10] and
T-MAC [14] employ local sleep-wake schedules know as vir-
tual clustering between node pairs to coordinate packet ex-
changes while reducing idle operation. Both schemes exchange
synchronizing packets to inform their neighbors of the interval
until their next activity and use CSMA prior to transmissions.
S-MAC results in clustering of channel activity and is hence
vulnerable to a statistical jammer.
Synchronous protocols such as RT-Link [13], utilize hard-
ware based time synchronization to precisely and periodi-
cally schedule activity in well-deﬁned TDMA slots. RT-Link
utilizes an out-of-band synchronization mechanism using an
AM broadcast pulse. Each node is equipped with two radios
- an AM receiver for time synchronization and an 802.15.4
transceiver for data communication. A central synchroniza-
tion unit periodically transmits a 50μs AM sync pulse. Each
node wakes up just before the expected pulse epoch and syn-
chronizes the operating system upon detecting the pulse. As
the out-of-band sync pulse is a high-power signal with no en-
coded data, it is not easily jammed by a malicious sensor
node.
In general, RT-Link outperforms B-MAC which in turn out-
performs S-MAC in terms of battery life across all event inter-
vals [13]. Figure 2 shows the relative node lifetimes for 2AA
batteries and similar transmission duty cycles. Here node life-
times for CSMA, S-MAC, B-MAC, and RT-link are 0.19, 0.54,
0.78 and 3 years respectively for a network of 10 nodes with
a 10s event sample period. While RT-Link nodes communi-
cate in periodic and well-deﬁned ﬁxed-size time slots as shown
in Figure 3, a statistical jammer is able to easily determine
the channel activity schedule and duration of each scheduled
transmission. As shown in Figure 4, an attacker can glean the
channel activity pattern by scanning the channel and sched-
Figure 4: An attacker can learn node schedules and
selectively jam active time slots
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Figure 5: SMAC PDF for 15% utilization
ule a jamming signal to coincide with the packet preamble at
the start of a time slot.
2.2.2 Statistical Jamming
We focus on the statistical jammer’s performance with S-
MAC and RT-Link as both result in explicit patterns in packet
inter-arrival times. We do not consider B-MAC as we aim to
leverage the more energy-eﬃcient RT-Link as a base synchro-
nized link-layer mechanism for WisperNet. We simulated a
network of 10 nodes in each case, with a 3ms average trans-
mission duration. In the case of S-MAC, we observe that all
nodes quickly converge on one major activity period of 215ms.
In Figure 5, we also notice a spike close to 2ms. This is the
interval between the transmission of control packets and data
packets at the start of an activity period. In the case of RT-
Link, we simulated four ﬂows with diﬀerent rates and hence
observe 4 distinct spikes in Figure 6. The other spikes with
lower intensity are harmonics due to multiples of 32 slots in
a frame. In both cases we observe distinct inter-arrival pat-
terns which enable a statistical jammer to eﬃciently attack
both protocols.
Our goal with WisperNet is to develop coordinated random-
ized schedules, packet sizes and routes such that a statistical
jammer is unable to extract any distinctive features from the
packet inter-arrival distribution.
2.3 Assumptions
We make several assumptions in the design and evalua-
tion of WisperNet. We assume the jammer is as energy-
constrained as a legitimate node and must maintain a stealth
operation with a low duty-cycle. All packets exchanged be-
tween nodes are encrypted with a group key shared by legiti-
mate nodes and hence the jammer is not protocol-aware. We
consider both malicious and non-malicious jamming and do
not diﬀerentiate between them as the anti-jamming mecha-
nisms are native to the link and network protocol. The trans-
mission power is 0dBm (1mW) and in the worst case (with
maximum power link jamming) the nominal packet delivery
rate is never below 2˜0%. This has been demonstrated in pre-
vious experiments [13]. For simplicity, we presume that inter-
ference range is equal to the transmission range of one hop.
This restriction does not limit our results. We assume all
communication is between a central gateway and each of the
nodes across one or more hops.
In this section we showed that statistical jammers, which
exploit the observed temporal patterns in channel activity, are
both more energy eﬃcient than reactive and random jammers
and more deceptive than constant jammers. With slot sched-
ule and slot duration randomization, the statistical jammer’s
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Figure 6: RT-Link PDF for 15% utilization
eﬃciency is reduced to that of a random jammer. Random
jammers, while relatively ineﬃcient are still eﬀective with cen-
sorship that increases linearly with link utilization. To avoid
a random jammer, it is essential not to schedule nodes within
the physical vicinity of the jamming source. We therefore
have to employ temporal randomization to combat a statisti-
cal jammer followed by spatial route adaptation to avoid the
resultant random jammer. Our goal is to develop a protocol
which, in the presence of a statistical jammer, has energy-
eﬃciency near that of RT-Link and a censorship ratio lower
than that of a random jammer.
3. ANTI-JAMMING WITH COORDINATED
SPATIO-TEMPORAL RANDOMIZATION
An eﬀective approach to diminish the impact of a statisti-
cal jammer on TDMA-based MAC protocols is to eliminate
the possibility to extract patterns in communication. These
patterns appear as a result of the use of ﬁxed schedules which
are set when a node joins a network and are assumed to re-
peat till the network is disbanded. Such simple and repetitive
patterns are maintained with tight time synchronization and
result in minimal energy consumption, deterministic end-to-
end delay and perhaps maximal transmission concurrency. In
order to limit the impact of statistical jamming but still ben-
eﬁt from the above energy and timeliness performance, we
maintain the time synchronization but change the schedule,
transmission duration and routes in a randomized yet coordi-
nated manner along small time scales.
Two components of the WisperNet protocol are Coordi-
nated Temporal Randomization (WisperNet-Time) and Co-
ordinated Spatial Adaptation (WisperNet-Space), which per-
form diﬀerent actions in the temporal and spatial domains
respectively. WisperNet-Time is designed to defeat statistical
jammers. By randomizing the communication in time, a sta-
tistical jammer’s performance is reduced to that of a random
jammer as the distribution of packet inter-arrival times is ﬂat.
No timing-based scheme can reduce the probability of being
jammed by a random pulse jammer. In this case, the only way
to decrease the jamming impact is by avoiding the jammed
areas using WisperNet-Space. WisperNet-Space implements
adaptive network routing as a jamming avoidance mechanism
to use links which are less aﬀected by the jammer, if possible.
Both WisperNet-Time and WisperNet-Space incorporate on-
line algorithms where the network is continuously monitored
and node operations are adjusted in time and space.
3.1 WisperNet-Time: Co-ordinated Temporal
Randomization
The main requirement for the proposed protocol is the pro-
vision of tight time synchronization between nodes. In order
to keep coordination between nodes, all nodes have to be in-
formed about current network state in terms of current slot
schedule, current slot duration and current active network
topology. We achieve this by building upon the FireFly sen-
sor network platform [15] and using the basic synchronization
mechanisms adopted in the RT-Link protocol. As illustrated
in Figure 3, all communication with RT-Link is in designated
time slots. 32 time slots form a frame and 32 frames form
a cycle. The time sync pulse is received once every cycle.
Each FireFly node is capable of both hardware-based global
time synchronization and software-based in-band time sync.
A second requirement for WisperNet is that changes in state
should require minimum gateway-to-node communication and
no state information exchange between nodes. All communi-
cation must be encrypted and authenticated so that an eaves-
dropper may not be able to extract the logical state of the
network. We describe the authentication and implicit coordi-
nation scheme in the following section and the synchronization
mechanism in the Implementation section.
3.1.1 Schedule Randomization
The ﬁrst step toward schedule randomization is a pruning of
the physical network topology graph into a directed acyclical
graph. Figure 7(a) shows an example network topology graph,
where each edge represents physical wireless link between two
nodes. The physical network topology is logically pruned by
disabling desired links. In order to logically remove a link, a
node is scheduled to sleep during that particular neighbor’s
transmission, thereby ignoring that transmission. By forming
a directed acyclic graph we are able to eﬃciently assign non-
colliding schedules that can be changed for every frame, as
shown in Figure 7(b). Links marked by the dashed line are
inactive but must be accounted for by any graph coloring
algorithm.
The algorithm for schedule randomization is organized in
a distributed manner. Every node uses a Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF) to obtain its transmission schedule from the
current network key and its node ID. The transmission sched-
ule consists of diﬀerent slot indexes that can be used for trans-
mission to neighboring nodes. The schedule changes for every
frame (i.e. 32 slots) and during a frame, a node transmits
only on the time-slots determined by its PRF output. After
transmission, every node goes to sleep, setting its sleep timer
to wake up for the earliest receive or transmit slot. In this
way energy consumption is reduced to minimum.
To obtain non-repeating schedules, but with full coordina-
tion between nodes, the PRF computed by every node uses
the current active network key along with its node ID. Once
in a cycle, between two synchronization pulses, the gateway
broadcasts the active keys for the next cycle. The keys, which
are members of the one-way key chain, are generated during
gateway’s initialization and are stored in its memory. All keys
from this chain are calculated from randomly chosen last key
Kn by repeatedly applying one-way function F (as shown in
(a) Physical net-
work topology
(b) Logical network topology
Figure 7: (a)Example network topology (b)its
collision-free transmit schedule from frame-to-frame
Figure 8: Generation of keys at the gateway, using a
one-way hash function.
Figure 8):
Kj = F (Kj+1), j = 0, 1, 2, ...n − 1.
As F is a one-way function, all previous members of chain
(K0,K1, ..., Kj−1) can be calculated from some chain element
Kj but subsequent chain members Kj ,Kj+1, ..., Kn [16] can-
not be derived. This authentication scheme is similar to [17,
18] but its use for scheduling is new.
We use the SHA1-HMAC[19] keyed-hash function to gen-
erate the current slot schedule. Therefore, for schedule com-
putation HMAC(ID,Kj) is used, where Kj presents cur-
rently active network key (member of the one-way key chain).
SHA1-HMAC outputs 160 bits which are used to specify the
schedule of transmission slots for each of the 32 frames. These
160 bits are divided into 32 groups of 5-bits, where the node’s
transmit schedule in i-th frame (i = 0, 1, 2, ...31) is determined
by i-th group of 5 bits. These 5 bits represent the index of
one of the 32 frame’s slots, eventually used for transmission.
Implicit Schedule Conﬂict Resolution
This approach for determining the transmission schedule lo-
cally can introduce a problem of potential interference that
may occur when neighboring nodes are assigned the same
random slot. To prevent this, every node, in addition to its
schedule, calculates a slot precedence (or priority) for every
transmission. The precedence for the i-th frame’s transmis-
sion schedule is determined by (32 − i)-th 5 bits group (i.e.
reverse order of the transmission schedule). Since there is an
even number of frames, the transmission schedule and prece-
dence are never extracted from same group of bits. Therefore,
to compute its schedule in one sync period with 32 frames,
each node has to calculate exactly one SHA1-HMAC function
for itself, and one SHA1-HMAC per node for all nodes in its
k-hop interference range. We assume the node IDs of all k-
hop neighbors are known [paja rev3-2] (when node joins
the network it broadcast its ID to all its neighbors in
k-hop range) [paja] remove end of this sentencevia pe-
riodic HELLO packets with a TTL of k. Given the IDs for all
nodes in its k-hop radius, a node calculates the schedule and
precedence for all of neighbors as shown in Figure 9. After
schedule conﬂicts are resolved implicitly based on the higher
precedence, the node follows the combined transmit and re-
ceive schedule in a single vector. [paja rev2-1] Proposed
solution introduces some additional memory and pro-
Figure 9: Implicit conﬂict resolution
cessing requirements that will be considered in details
in implementation section.
The proposed slot conﬂict resolution can have minor ineﬃ-
ciencies when a node with a higher transmit precedence for a
particular slot does not have any message to send, while the
another node is not allowed to send its message in the same
slot due to a lower precedence. This results in a lower end-to-
end bandwidth and an increase in a message delay. However,
this issue has a fairly low probability of occurring in networks
for sensor networks with a low to moderate duty cycle.
3.1.2 Slot size randomization
The proposed schedule randomization prevents a statistical
jammer from performing eﬃcient jamming by transmitting
pulse attacks in slots designated for nodes’ communication.
However, even with the schedule randomization, an adversary
is able to estimate slot sizes from the probability distribution
function (PDF) of packet inter-arrival times [3]. This statis-
tical jamming scheme allows the jammer to transmit short
pulse attacks at beginning of each slot, therefore corrupting
all communication attempts. Although this scheme is less en-
ergy eﬃcient than a ﬁxed schedule TDMA protocol, it is still
more eﬃcient than a random jammer.
Slot size randomization is implemented in a similar man-
ner to slot schedule randomization, using SHA1-HMAC, as
schedule randomization, but with one important diﬀerence.
Instead of using the last revealed key for the slot size calcu-
lation, every node uses a shared predeﬁned key, Kslot, and
the network’s state counter cnt. Therefore, for slot size ran-
domization the PRF is calculated as HMAC(cnt,Kslot). The
cycle counter is transmitted in the header of each packet and
is incremented every cycle. Kslot is intentionally a local key
so that a node joining the network will be able to synchro-
nize its slot sizes after receiving one legitimate packet. The
SHA1-HMAC’s output, which is also calculated for a frame-
by-frame basis, deﬁnes the slot size for next frame as shown in
Figure 10. The network’s state counter represents the num-
ber of synchronization pulses received by the network, and its
value is exchanged between neighboring nodes in the header
of every packet. Here we assume that every sync pulse is
received as it is a global and high-power AM pulse, so it is
only nodes who want to join an already operational network
need to be informed about current network counter. The
proposed coordinated slot size randomization scheme assures
that all nodes know the current frame’s slot sizes and allows
them to calculate an accurate time interval for their transmis-
sions/receptions.
If a key from the key chain is used for slot size calcula-
tion instead predeﬁned one, cases when node does not receive
key from the gateway would result in complete loss of synchro-
nization. Without correct information about a slot size, nodes
that do not know the current frame size are not able to sched-
ule themselves to wake-up for the expected sync pulse. [paja
rev1-2] With predefined key used for slot size calcula-
tions, nodes are always available to know size of each
frame, therefore they are able to schedule it awakening
Figure 10: Slot size randomization on a frame-by-
frame basis
on time.
Slot sizes can have values from a discrete set, where the
set size is determined by the number of bits output from the
PRF. The number of values used for slot sizes and relative
distance between them have direct inﬂuence on PDF of packet
inter-arrivals times. Anti-jamming goal is to have a uniform
PDF, or at least a PDF with spikes ﬂattened as much as
possible, which does not allow timing information extraction.
It is recommended that at least 8 slot sizes with small relative
diﬀerence between them be used.
Slot size randomization requires additional memory resources
if nodes need to send some ﬁxed-size data block in a ﬁxed time
interval. In this case slot sizes can be both smaller and bigger
than the size necessary for data block transmission, which can
result in lower network utilization in former case or data con-
gestion in later case. In the latter case, a portion of the data
available for transmission will have to be buﬀered in node’s in-
ternal queue till the next transmission slot occurs. Of course,
in this case, the average slot size must be larger than slot size
needed for one data block transmission. The size of the queue
needed in every node is directly connected with ratio between
these two sizes.
3.2 WisperNet-Time: Performance Analysis
We now investigate the impact of channel utilization on
the PDF of packet inter-arrival times. We also determine the
buﬀering needs due to randomized slot sizing and its impact
on the end-to-end delay. Finally we look at the censorship
ratio vs. jammer’s lifetime for RT-Link, S-MAC and Wisper-
Net.
We conducted a simulation in Matlab on a protocol with
structure similar to RT-Link [13], where each cycle consists
of 32 frames and each frame consists of 32 slots. At the be-
ginning of every cycle a synchronization pulse is transmitted.
We have simulated a system where slot sizes have uniform
distribution with values in range [1 5]ms. A maximum slot
size of 5ms is chosen to match the maximum message size
of 128 bytes for IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver with data rate of
250kbps[7]. 128 bytes can be sent with transmission duration
of 4.2ms and the rest of the slot time is used for inter-slot
processing and for guard times. A simulation for 10000 syn-
chronization pulses (i.e. cycles) was carried out, which on an
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Figure 11: (Top) PDF of inter-arrival times for Wis-
perNet. (Bottom) Corresponding CDF.
average lasts 50 minutes.
We ﬁrst simulated the inﬂuence of the link utilization factor
(U ) on the PDF of inter-arrival times and show that it has
very little inﬂuence with the proposed scheme. This is one of
the major beneﬁts of WisperNet-Time, because for other pro-
tocols the only way to reduce spikes in the PDF is to reduce
the utilization factor, as proposed in [3]. Results for PDF of
inter-arrival times are shown in in Figure 11 for three dif-
ferent utilization factor [paja rev3-3] utilization factor
equal to 50%, where slot sizes were randomly chosen from
one of the 32 possible values in desired span. Channel utiliza-
tion has an eﬀect on the PDF but in smaller scale comparing
to B-MAC. With U below 50%, a small increment can be
seen on spikes in (5 10]ms interval. Also with integer multi-
ples of some slot sizes within [1 5]ms interval, inﬂuence of U
can almost be ignored. Due to the uniform distribution for all
three cases of U it is not possible to extract slot sizes. Even
if the PDF is derived from a smaller statistical sample size,
the results are similar due to the pseudo-randomness of the
slot size.
To analyze how the slot size changes aﬀect the end-to-end
delay, we simulated a 1-dimension chain with 20 nodes. In
every frame, each node forwards the previously received data
to next node. If the slot size is smaller than necessary to
transmit the backlogged data, the maximum allowed packet
size is sent and a rest of the data is buﬀered. In a simulated
chain, the source node receives ﬁxed size data blocks at a ﬁxed
interval and at a slightly smaller size than for an average slot
size (e.g. 3ms).
Figure 12 presents PDF and CDF of delay at last node
for diﬀerent slot’s size quantizations. We observe that with
ﬁner quantization of slot sizes, the distribution interval of the
last node has not only a smaller maximum delay but also
a smaller possible set of delay values that can be expected.
The reason is that ﬁner quantization allows better data dis-
tribution per packets and therefore reduces the delay caused
with packets fragmentation. Expectedly, this randomization
introduced some additional delay. In a TDMA system with a
constant slot size of 3ms, the delay at the last node would be
20·3ms = 60ms. Here average delay is around 75ms, but with
95% probability interval [67 88]ms. This shows that random-
ization introduces some variability into the communication
end-to-end delay estimation.
Another potential side-eﬀect of WisperNet-Time is a need
for additional memory for data queuing. In Figure 13, the
maximum queue size for every node in chain is presented.
The ﬁrst node, with its constant data block input, requires
a buﬀer with an additional 512 bytes of memory. All other
nodes require an additional buﬀer for one maximum sized
packet.
Fig. 14 presents the relationship between the jammer’s life-
time (LIFE) and censorship ratio (CR) for communication in
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Figure 12: Message delay and its Cumulative Distri-
bution at last node, for 20 nodes chain
its range. We simulated the inﬂuence of two types of jam-
mers - statistical jammers (SJ) and random jammers (RJ) -
on diﬀerent kinds of protocols. Both these types of jammers
transmit 150μs-long pulse attacks. We modeled these attacks
with a 90% success rate of packet corruption in cases when
jamming pulse is transmitted during node’s communication.
For RT-link and WisperNet-Time, we used the protocols pre-
viously described, while for Random Schedule TDMA (RST-
DMA) we used a protocol also with 32 slots per frame, where
every slot is 3ms long. All protocols are simulated for systems
with 25% of network utilization.
As we expected, for RT-Link and S-MAC, the SJ’s lifetime
is very high. As shown, RSTDMA is easily jammed and the
SJ enjoys the longest lifetime. In addition, the slot size ran-
domization component decreases the jammer’s lifetime, for
almost 0.1 years at 50% CR. Note that diﬀerences between
LIFE-CR curve for SJ and RJ are caused only by the fact
that SJ does not transmit pulses in intervals smaller than
1ms, which, in this case, is the smallest slot size (only param-
eter that can be extracted from input signal statistics). We
observe that schedule randomization has a signiﬁcantly higher
impact on the jammer’s lifetime than does slot size random-
ization. This justiﬁes our decision to use a pre-stored key for
the latter’s calculations, while using keys from the gateway’s
one-way chain for former. If some nodes are captured and
compromised, only the predeﬁned slot-size key would be risk
being extracted.
4. WISPERNET-SPACE:
COORDINATED SPATIAL ADAPTATION
For WisperNet-Space, we consider a dense sensor network
where each node is modeled as a unit disk graph. The network
is represented as an undirected graph G(V,E) where V is a
set of nodes (vertices) and E a set of links (edges). For each
link e = e(u, v), k weights (or costs) wj(u, v), (j = 1, 2, ..., k)
are associated. For a tree T in graph G, the aggregate weight
Wj(T ) is deﬁned as
Wj(T ) =
∑
e∈T
wj(e), j = 1, 2, ..., k
Weights associated with each link describe the diﬀerent types
of costs which may include the network’s para-functional prop-
erties, such as reliability of network communication, or delay
and energy consumption of a sensor network.
In general a set L ⊆ V of terminal nodes is given and the
objective is to ﬁnd a connected subgraph, spanning all the
terminals with minimal aggregate weights for all j = 1, 2, ...k.
If only one weighting function is considered, L = T and the
connected subgraph is required to be a tree, then the prob-
lem is deﬁned as a Minimum Spanning Tree problem (MST).
The MST problem can be solved using known algorithms
(Kruskal’s, Boruvka’s, etc) [20]. If L = T and also only one
weighting functions is considered, problem is equivalent to
Steiner minimal tree problem (SMT). SMT is a NP-complete
problem, but several heuristics exist which resolve SMT prob-
lem in both a centralized and a distributed manner. For some
application where more than one weighting function needs to
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Figure 13: Maximum queue size for each node in 20
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Figure 14: (a) Dependency between jammer’s lifetime and Censorship Ratio and (b) zoomed
be deﬁned, algorithms for multi-constrained routing are used
in order to control all application’s important para-functional
properties of the network.
For WisperNet-Space we only considered network’s reliabil-
ity, so we associate a reliability weight function for each link
in network. We deﬁne the weight of each link to be a function
of the packet loss ratio and hence aim to derive routes which
connect all essential nodes with the most reliable links. By
continually executing a cost minimization function, we are es-
sentially able to avoid links under the inﬂuence of a random
jammer.
The network’s reliability is measured in terms of its Packet
Delivery Ratio (PDR) which is deﬁned as the ratio of pack-
ets that are successfully delivered to a destination [2]. PDR
can be perceived as the probability of error-free communica-
tion between two nodes. Thus, the reliability of a path P in
the given network can be deﬁned as a
∏
e∈P PDR(e). Our
goal is to achieve maximum reliability on a path P , which is
equivalent to maximizing
ln
∏
e∈P
PDR(e) =
∑
e∈P
lnPDR(e).
With PDR(e) ≤ 1 for path P , our goal is to minimize∑
e∈P |lnPDR(e)|. Therefore, the reliability weight for some
link e = e(u, v) is deﬁned as
wr(u, v) = |lnPDR(u, v)|.
For adaptive routing in WisperNet-Space, we use a MST-
Steiner heuristic to solve the SMT problem. All active nodes
periodically send the PDRs for all their active links to the
gateway. After receiving a link’s weight, the gateway updates
its weight table for all existing links in the network. Since
PDR is not deﬁned for inactive (not used) links, these links
keep same weights as before present network topology became
valid. Their weights can not be reset to zero, since that would
allow some heavily jammed links to become competitive for
network routing right in next iteration.
In order to defend against mobile jammers, the weights of
unused network’s links are processed in time with a leaky
integrator. To avoid situations where some previously heavily
jammed link still has a high weight although the jammer that
caused it has moved away, for every link e = e(u, v) and the
current active subgraph T , the reliability weight for the next
network topology calculation is deﬁned as:
wr(u, v) =
{ |lnPDR(u, v)|, e ∈ T
ρ · wr(u, v), e /∈ T
ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a leaky constant that determines a speed of
network’s adaptation to jammers’ mobility. It is not recom-
mended to set a too small value for ρ, since something similar
to previously described situation can happen, when a jammed
link can be repeatedly included in active topology after very
short duration. [paja rev2-3] For example with ρ = 0.8
reliability weight for link that is not in use would be
reduced by 20% for every calculation of network topol-
ogy, which would allow inclusion of the jammed link
into new topology after only a few iterations. If all jam-
mers have ﬁxed positions, ρ can be set to 1. [paja rev2-3
remove next sentence -> moved to performance analysisIn
our experiments we use a value of 0.999.
After updating its weights table, the gateway calculates the
new active topology with minimum costs to reach all Steiner
points (i.e. active nodes). To distribute the information about
active links, we used the Prufer code (sequence) [20], a unique
sequence associated with a tree, which for a tree with N ver-
tices contains N − 2 elements. In addition to this code, we
send a second code sequence that maps the node ID of the
active nodes to the index of the N − 2 sequence. In a case
of dense networks, with N nodes, from which the Steiner tree
is derived, a much smaller number of nodes (M) may be ac-
tive. Therefore for all M nodes from the Steiner tree, diﬀerent
temporal IDs are assigned from 1 : M interval, and for that
tree, a Prufer code with M − 2 elements is derived. Along
with this sequence and number of active nodes, M , a look-up
table with size M − 2 is sent, where i-th position in this table
contains ID of a node, that is indexed as i in the Prufer code
sequence. In this way only 2 · M − 1 values are sent from
gateway and can be encapsulated within one maximum-sized
128 byte IEEE 802.15.4 packet.
This message from gateway is distributed over the network
using all active links. Since some currently inactive nodes
may be included into new active topology, the mechanism
to inform them is included. All inactive nodes wake up af-
ter every sync pulse, and listen for ﬁrst 8 slots in a frame.
These 8 contention slots are used for new topology distribu-
tion. RT-Link supports both contention and contention-free
slots and thus makes it convenient to include both sched-
uled and asynchronous control traﬃc. In our implementa-
tion, WisperNet-Space computes a new network topology ev-
ery 1024 sync pulses.
4.1 WisperNet-Space: Performance Analysis
In order to evaluate the performance of WisperNet-Space
under random jamming attacks we ﬁrst simulated an SMT
network with a random topology. A network with 400 ran-
domly distributed nodes in a 4km x 4km square was analyzed.
We also randomly distributed nine jamming nodes, each with
the same RF characteristics as network’s nodes. To empha-
size the jamming eﬀect in order to test WisperNet-Space’s
adaptation, the jammers’ link utilization is set to 50%. We
implemented a communication protocol so that all neighbor-
ing nodes exchange exactly one message per frame. Changes
in network routes for both SMT and MST components are
performed once in 100 frames. [paja rev2-3 In our exper-
iments we used a value of 0.999 for ρ. For this value
reliability weight of unused link decreases 1% for every
period of 96 seconds (on average).
Figure 15(a) presents the initial network topology and the
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(a) Network topology - beginning
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(b) Network topology at an interme-
diate time instance, t1
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(c) Network topology - optimal
Figure 15: Network topology; green links - actual, ”physical” links; red - links used for Steiner tree; blue
nodes - terminal nodes (members of set L); dark gray area - area under jammers’ inﬂuence
initial routes. The terminal nodes (active nodes in the Steiner
Tree) and areas under attack by the jammers are highlighted.
We observe a large number of active links are under attack.
The average censorship ratio for this network is 9% for this
startup conﬁguration. The censorship ratio decreases to less
than 1% as the routes adapt to more realible paths. The
censorship ratio can not go below this minimum value. This
is because for the given Steiner tree topology and its distri-
bution of jamming regions, the best case routes determiend
by WisperNet-Space do include at least 2 partially jammed
links. The optimal conﬁguration includes 0 links jammed in
both direction and 2 links jammed in only one direction, as
shown in Figure 16.
We observed that at some intermediate moments (for ex-
ample moments t1 and t2 as seen in Figure 15(b) and corre-
sponding Figure 17) network routes with more jammed links
were chosen, which directly resulted in increase of the overall
censorship ratio. This is more prominent at the beginning of
the WisperNet-Space’s operation when all links start with the
same minimum weight (0). We see in Figure 15(b), three links
are jammed in both directions in the top-right corner. As the
routing algorithm explores the problem space with diﬀerent
sets of active links, it often chooses links under heavy inﬂu-
ence of the jammer. As this procedure of reﬁning the route
continues and more links are evaluated for the ﬁrst time, the
algorithm will choose jammed links only if its weight, due
to the leaky integrator, drops below a threshold that would
make the aggregate weight of a subgraph smaller than the ag-
gregate weight of currently used subgraph. We observe these
spikes in the networks censorship ration in Figure 17. Fig-
ure 15(c) presents optimal solution where only two links from
highlighted area, jammed in only one direction, are used for
routing. Over the course of the adaptation for one hour, we
observer in Figure 18 that the number of active links does
not vary much. We also noticed the stretch factor of the net-
work path lengths is ≤1.3 due to the end-to-end weight mini-
mization function for calculating cumulative packet reliability
across multiple links.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
The WisperNet anti-jamming protocol was implemented on
a network of FireFly sensor nodes. Each node consists of a
microcontroller, an 802.15.4 2.4GHz transceiver and multiple
sensors. Figure 20 shows two conﬁgurations of the FireFly
node - one with in-band software-based time synchronization
and the other with an add-on AM radio receiver for receiving
an out-of-band AM sync pulse. In order to achieve the highly
accurate time synchronization required for TDMA at a packet
level granularity, we use a carrier-current AM transmitter to
provide an out-of-band time synchronization pulse. The time
synchronization transmitter plugged into the wall-outlet and
used the building’s power grid as an extended AM antenna
and was thus able to cover the entire building. Nodes were
synchronized with a 50μs pulse that was transmitted every 10
seconds from the AM transmitter (see [15] for details).
We implemented our jamming avoidance scheme incorpo-
rating SHA1, SHA1-HMAC, gateway schedule updates and
neighbor information exchange in 8-bit ﬁxed-point C for the
Atmel ATMEGA32L microcontroller and a 16-bit 16MHz TI
MSP430F22x microcontroller[21]. Each node ran the nano-
RK[22] real-time operating system and the RT-Link[13] link
protocol. The RT-Link TDMA cycle includes 32 frames which
in turn are composed of 32 slots. The slot size were assigned
values from [1 5]ms. In our tests, every node attempts to
transmit one message per frame.
We observe that most of the current hardware platforms
used for wireless sensor networks development are not CPU-
constrained, but have a memory limitation. Our implementa-
tion of the SHA1-HMAC function required only 3 additional
160-bit buﬀers as the comparison of schedules and prece-
dences is done iteratively for all the node’s neighbors. The
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SHA1-HMAC function required 12.5ms for calculations on
TI’s MSP430F22x microcontroller. For networks where max-
imal node’s degree in a network is N , every node, in the worst
case, needs to execute SHA1-HMAC function (N2 + 1) times
for schedule calculation and once more for slot size computa-
tion in every sync period. For example if N = 5, in worst case
27 SHA1-HMAC function executions are needed, which re-
sults in 337.5ms of CPU time used for these calculations in ev-
ery sync period, where one sync period contains 32 ·32 = 1024
slots, with sizes from 1ms to 5ms. Therefore in worst case
less than 33% of CPU processing is used for these calcula-
tions, while on average less than 11% is used. From perpec-
tive of memory constraints, the implemented procedure for
schedule randomization uses 276 bytes of ﬂash memory and
400 bytes of RAM. Since only two nodes’ schedules have to be
available at the same, schedule calculation procedure occupies
only 236 byts for code size, along with additional 40 bytes of
data pre-stored in FLASH. As same code is used for slot size
randomization, and since this procedure is called after previ-
ous calculations, no additional memory is needed for slot size
computation.
In Figure 19, we connected three nodes to the oscilloscope
to display the transmit and receive activity. Two nodes were
programmed to be a transmit and receive pair to show the co-
ordinated and collision-free schedule randomization. A third
node was programmed to raise a signal on every slot to pro-
vide a reference of the slot boundaries. In Figure 21, the
top signal on the oscilloscope is triggered by the transmit pin
of the transmitter and the middle signal is triggered by the
receive pin on the receiver. The signal at the bottom is trig-
gered on every slot interval to provide a reference of the slot
boundaries. We observe that the schedule is both coordinated
and changes on a frame-by-frame basis.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Jamming, whether malicious or due to unintended inter-
ference, results in a loss of link reliability, increased energy
consumption, extended packet delays and disruption of end-
to-end routes. Resilience to jamming and its avoidance, col-
lectively termed as anti-jamming, is a hard practical problem
as the jammer has an unfair advantage in detecting legitimate
communication activity and simultaneously attacking multi-
ple links due to the broadcast nature of the channel. In the
context of energy-constrained sensor networks, the goal of the
link protocol is to maximize the common sleep time between
nodes. This results in node schedules with predictable pat-
terns - making it an easy target for a statistical jammer.
In this paper we proposed the WisperNet anti-jamming
protocol which uses Coordinated Temporal Randomization
Figure 19: Experimental setup with 3 FireFly nodes
Figure 20: FireFly nodes with AM sync module
of transmissions (WisperNet-Time) to reduce the censorship
ratio of a statistical jammer to that of a random jammer. A
second component of WisperNet is Coordinated Spatial Adap-
tation (WisperNet-Space), where network routes are adapted
continually to avoid jammed regions (and hence random jam-
mers) and select paths with the max packet delivery ratio.
We observe some limitations with our current implemen-
tation. The WisperNet-Spatial routing scheme is centralized
and will not scale well in large networks (>500 nodes) under
moderate to heavy attack as the message from the gateway
may not get through. While several distributed heuristics
for the MST problem exist, they require a large amount of
information with respect to shortest paths from a node to
all other nodes in the network. These schemes are not con-
ducive to energy-constrained and memory-constrained sensor
networks. We aim to explore distributed solutions further.
A second limitation is that all non-active nodes in the MST
are required to receive for few contention slots (i.e. 8 in our
implementation) every cycle to receive and forward a route
update message. This may be wasteful if the network is not
under heavy attack from jammers.
Through simulation and experiments, we demonstrate that
WisperNet is able to eﬀectively reduce the impact of statis-
tical and random jammers. Unlike coding-based schemes,
WisperNet is resilient to jamming even under moderate to
high link utilization with ≤2% censorship rate for the net-
work topologies explored in this work. The schedules derived
from WisperNet are non-repeating, with randomized packet
lengths while maintaining coordinated and collision-free com-
munication. WisperNet has been implemented on a network
of FireFly sensor nodes with tightly synchronized operation
and low operation overhead.
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